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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-3887 
 
RONALD CAMP, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EDWARD BRENNAN, Superintendent; BROOKS, Deputy 
Superintendent; MARQUART, Deputy Superintendent; 
JOHN THOMPSON, SR.; Clark, Guard; WALMSLEY, 
Guard; BURTON, Guard; BYERLEY, Guard; JONES, 
 
Guard; and JOHN DOES 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 98-cv-180 E) 
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
 
Argued May 11, 2000 
 
Before: GREENBERG and MCKEE, Circuit Judges, 
and SHADUR,1 District Judge  
 
(Filed: July 18, 2000) 
 
       Peter M. Suwak (argued) 
       Pete's Surplus Building, P.O. Box 1 
       Washington, PA 15301 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District Judge for 
the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
 
 
  
       D. Michael Fisher 
       Attorney General 
       Calvin R. Koons 
       Senior Deputy Attorney General 
        (argued) 
       John G. Knorr, III 
       Chief Deputy Attorney General 
       Chief, Appellate Litigation Section 
       15th Fl., Strawberry Square 
       Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, District Judge. 
 
Prisoner Ronald Camp ("Camp") filed this 42 U.S.C. 
S1983 ("Section 1983") action pro se, alleging that prison 
guards violated his civil rights by using excessive and 
unnecessary force against him. Following a defense motion 
in the alternative to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter issued a report on 
August 6, 1999 recommending that the motion be granted 
based upon Camp's failure to have exhausted his 
administrative remedies. District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin 
adopted the recommendation and granted the motion on 
September 30, 1999. We reverse and remand. 
 
Background 
 
Camp filed a pro se complaint alleging that in October 
1996 prison guards used excessive and unnecessary force 
when they assaulted and stun gunned him while extracting 
him from his cell in the Restrictive Housing Unit of SCI- 
Albion. Camp asserts that despite his attempts tofile a 
grievance after the incident, his complaint was not 
processed at all because he was on grievance restriction. In 
addition, Camp says that many SCI-Albion officers told him 
that none of his grievances would get to the Grievance 
Coordinator because the grievances were about the officers' 
co-workers. For those reasons, Camp says, he stopped 
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trying to file a claim at SCI-Albion because no one would 
help him. 
 
After Camp left SCI-Albion he submitted a grievance to 
the Office of Professional Responsibility. On July 20, 1998 
that office sent Camp a letter stating that the matter was 
outside its jurisdiction but that it would forward Camp's 
complaint to the appropriate office for review. According to 
an August 20, 1998 letter from the Office of the Secretary 
of Corrections, Camp's allegations were investigated 
thoroughly and a determination was made that his 
complaint lacked credibility and that the officers' actions 
were justified. 
 
Defendants contend that Camp did not exhaust the 
administrative remedies under the grievance procedure 
codified by Department of Corrections Policy Number DC- 
ADM 804. (See App. 20a-25a) In support of that position, 
defendants offer the declaration of Chief Hearing Examiner 
Robert Bitner ("Bitner") that described the grievance 
process and stated that after reviewing Camp's records, 
Bitner had found that Camp had not completed the 
necessary steps of the grievance procedure. 
 
Because the district court went beyond Camp's 
Complaint (as do we) to consider the evidentiary matters 
just discussed, any Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) attack is 
converted into one under Rule 56. We have jurisdiction of 
such a final summary judgment under 28 U.S.C.S1291. 
And our review of the district court's decision is plenary 
under such decisions as Kornegay v. Cottingham , 120 F.3d 
392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Administrative Exhaustion Vel Non 
 
Camp has urged a dual basis for reversal. At the outset 
he has contended that the district court erred in granting 
defendants' motion because excessive force complaints, 
unlike complaints regarding general prison conditions, do 
not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
under 42 U.S.C. S1997e(a)("Section 1997e(a)"): 
 
       No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
       conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
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       Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, 
       or other correctional facility until such administrative 
       remedies as are available are exhausted. 
 
As his second contention, he has argued that even if the 
statute does apply to such claims, the circumstances that 
he has had to deal with take him out of the statutory reach. 
 
As for Camp's first argument, post-briefing events have 
defeated it. We have held in Booth v. Churner , 206 F.3d 
289, 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2000) that excessive force is indeed 
a "prison condition" for Section 1997e(a) purposes, so that 
the statutory exhaustion requirement does apply to such 
claims. Hence the district court correctly found that Camp 
needed to exhaust his administrative remedies before 
bringing a Section 1983 excessive force action. 
 
But we find Camp's second position persuasive. It will be 
recalled that (understandably enough) under Section 
1997e(a) the prisoner need only exhaust such 
administrative remedies "as are available." From Camp's 
description of events at SCI-Albion, which defendants have 
not refuted in factual terms, he faced something of a Catch- 
22 situation there. But even were that not the case, we are 
told by defendants themselves that Camp's allegations have 
been fully examined on the merits by the ultimate 
administrative authority and have been found wanting. 
With that substantive determination having already been 
made at the highest level, there would be even more reason 
to invoke the Joseph Heller metaphor to describe any 
notion that Camp must jump through any further 
administrative hoops to get the same answer. Thus judicial 
consideration is now open to him. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the district court's holding that excessive force 
claims are subject to the statutory exhaustion requirement. 
But having done so, we further hold that Camp has met 
that requirement and remand this case for resolution on 
the merits. 
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